The rational expectations equilibrium (REE), as introduced in Radner (1979) in a general equilibrium setting à la Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie, often fails to have desirable properties such as universal existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency. We resolve those problems by providing a new model which makes the REE a desirable solution concept. In particular, we consider an asymmetric information economy with a continuum of agents whose private signals are independent conditioned on the macro states of nature. For such an economy, agents are allowed to augment their private information by the available public signals. We prove the existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency for this new REE concept.
Introduction
In seminal papers, Radner (1979) and Allen (1981) extended the finite agent Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie economy to allow for asymmetric information, where each agent is characterized by a random utility function, random initial endowment, and private information with a prior. The equilibrium notion that Radner put forward is called rational expectations equilibrium (REE), which is an extension of the deterministic Walrasian equilibrium of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model. According to the REE, each individual maximizes interim expected utility conditioned on her own private information as well as the information generated by the equilibrium price.
By now it is well known that in a finite agent economy with asymmetric information, a rational expectations equilibrium may not exist 1 (see Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 722 , for an example due to Kreps), may not be incentive compatible, may not be Pareto optimal and may not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game (see Glycopantis et al., 2005, p. 31 , and also Example 9.1.1, p. 43). Thus, if the intent of the REE notion is to capture contracts among agents under asymmetric information, then such contacts not only do they not exist universally in well behaved economies (i.e., economies with concave, continuous, monotone utility functions and strictly positive initial endowments),
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but even if they exist, they fail to have desirable properties, such as incentive compatibility, Pareto optimality and Bayesian rationality.
The main difficulty that one encounters with the REE in a finite agent economy is the fact that individuals are supposed to maximize their interim expected utility conditioned not only on their own private information, but also on the information generated by the equilibrium price; at the same time, the individuals can influence the equilibrium price to their own benefit by manipulating their private information. However, this would not have been a problem if each agent's private information is negligible. This poses the following question. Is it possible to model the REE in such a way that each agent's effect on the equilibrium price is negligible and therefore the REE concept overcomes the difficulties encountered above?
We introduce a new model where the REE concept becomes free of the problems mentioned above. In particular, we consider an asymmetric information economy with a continuum of agents whose private signals are independent conditioned on the macro states of nature. For such an economy, agents are allowed to augment their private information by the available public signals. We call this new notion REE with aggregate signals. However, it is shown in Sun et al. (forthcoming) that it is not true that under a REE in a large economy, the agents will automatically report their signals truthfully. We need to consider those REE prices that capture the meaning of perfect competition, i.e., they depend only on the macro states and are not influenced by individual agents' private information. In this case, incentive compatibility is not an issue since an individual agent's private signal can influence neither the macro states nor the aggregate signals. We then prove the existence and efficiency for this new REE notion. We also show that whenever the equilibrium price fully reveals the macro states, the notion of REE with aggregate signals is equivalent to the notion of REE in the classical sense.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the economic model, the notions of REE, Pareto optimality and incentive compatibility, and some assumptions. The main result is stated in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss related literature. Some concluding remarks are provided in Section 5. The proofs are given in Appendix A.
The economic model
In this section, we define the notion of a private information economy, followed by the definitions of rational expectations equilibrium, rational expectations equilibrium with aggregate signals, Pareto optimality and incentive compatibility.
Private information economy
We consider an atomless probability space 2 (I, I, λ) as the space of agents. Each agent receives a private signal of type
3 Let T 0 denote the power set of T 0 , and (T 0 ) the set of all probability distributions on T
.
A signal profile t is a function from I to T 0 . For i ∈ I , t(i) (also denoted by t i ) is the private signal of agent i while t −i is the restriction of t to the set I \ {i}. Let (T , T , P ) be a probability space that models the uncertainty associated with the private signal profiles for all the agents. 4 For simplicity, we shall assume that (T , T ) has a product structure so that T is the product of T −i and T 0 , while T is the product σ -algebra of T 0 and a σ -algebra T −i on T −i . For t ∈ T and t i ∈ T 0 , we shall adopt the usual notation (t −i , t i ) to denote the signal profile whose value is t i for i and t j for j = i. The private signal process is a function from
be the projection mapping from T to T
is the conditional probability measure on the measurable space (
We also would like to include another source of uncertainty in our model -the macro level uncertainty. Let S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s K } be the set of all possible macro states of nature, and S the power set of S. The S-valued random variables on T models the macro level uncertainty. For each macro state s ∈ S, denote the event (s = s) = {t ∈ T :s(t) = s} that s occurs by C s . The probability that s occurs is π s = P (C s ). Without loss of generality, assume that π s > 0 for each s ∈ S.
Let P s be the conditional probability measure on (T , T ) when the random variables takes value s. Thus, for each B ∈ T ,
It is obvious that P = s∈S π s P s . Note that the conditional probability measure P s is often denoted as P (·|s) in the literature.
The common consumption set for all the agents is the positive orthant R m + . Let u be a function from I × R m + × T to R + such that for any given i ∈ I , u(i, z, t) is the utility of agent i at consumption bundle z ∈ R m + and signal profile t ∈ T . For any given (i, t) ∈ I × T , we assume that u(i, z, t) (also denoted by u (i,t) (z) 
We use the convention that all probability spaces are countably additive. 3 In the literature, one usually assumes that different agents have different sets of private signals and requires that agents receive each of them with positive probability. For notational simplicity, we choose to work with a common set T 0 of private signals, but allow zero probability for some of the redundant signals. There is no loss of generality in this latter approach. 4 Thus T is a space of functions from I to T 0 . 5 In the sequel, we shall often use subscripts to denote some variable of a function that is viewed as a parameter in a particular context. 6 The utility function u(i, ·, t) is monotonic if for any y, z ∈ R m + with y z and y = z, u (i, y, t) < u(i, z, t) . 7 The measure structure on the product space I × T will be specified in Section 2.3.
In our model, the initial endowment of an agent depends on her private signal. The initial endowment profile e is a function the letter p will be used both for a price and a price process. The terms "price" and "price process" are used synonymously in this paper.
We shall now introduce some notation for aggregate signals. For any t ∈ T , the empirical signal distribution is λ f
is the fraction of agents whose private signal is q when the signal profile is t ∈ T . It is clear that λ f
t , which is also called the aggregate signals. As mentioned in the introduction, we consider the classical rational expectations equilibrium (REE) and REE with aggregate signals. We shall define a general notion of rational expectations equilibrium (REE) via a state signal formulation as in Mas-Colell et al. (1995) .
9 Various related basic concepts are then defined for this general notion that covers the two special cases.
We consider a signal process
in the two special cases we consider here. For agent i ∈ I , F (i, t) is the derived signal of agent i from the signal profile t, which is simply t i in the first case and (t i ,μ(t)) in the second case. We shall allow agent i to use the information as described by F i and the information revealed by the equilibrium price. An allocation x to be a measurable mapping from
) is the consumption bundle of agent i when the price is p and her derived signal is g.
Since an agent's initial endowment is contingent on her private signal q ∈ T 0 , we denote the budget set for agent i by
when the price is p and her private signal is q. Hence,
and a price p, the interim (conditional) expected utility of agent i is defined as follows:
In the rational expectations equilibrium, an agent updates her belief on the distribution of signal profiles based on her signal and observation of the equilibrium price. She computes her expected utility with the updated belief and aims to maximize the interim expected utility subject to her budget constraint. The formal definition of the rational expectations equilibrium is given below.
Definition 1 (Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE)).
A rational expectations equilibrium for the private information economy
,s} is a pair of an allocation and a price process (x * , p * ) such that:
) is a maximizer of the following problem:
The following definition of interim efficiency is self-explanatory.
Definition 2 (Interim efficiency).
A REE (x * , p * ) is said to be interim efficient if for P -almost all t ∈ T , there does not exist an integrable function y t from I to R m + such that
When the signal process F is the private signal process f , Definition 1 simply defines a REE in the classical sense; an agent updates her belief based on her own private signal and observation of the equilibrium price. On the other hand, the information on the relative frequency of private signals should be easily available. As we consider a large economy, an individual agent cannot influence such a signal distribution, which is thus a robust statistic to be used by individual agents. When the signal process F takes the form ( f ,μ), the corresponding equilibrium concept as in Definition 1 is called rational expectations equilibrium with aggregate signals. This means that in the REE with aggregate signals, agent i updates her belief on the distribution of signal profiles upon observing the price p, her own private signal q and the empirical signal distribution μ.
Conditional independence
In order to study the relationship between the two REE notions introduced above and to prove our main result, we shall need to work with the assumption of conditional independence of private signals given the macro states.
Definition 3. The private signal process f is essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the macro state of natures.
That is, for λ-almost all i ∈ I ,t i andt j are independent conditioned ons for λ-almost j ∈ I .
10
The above condition on f will be imposed on the rest of this paper unless otherwise noted. When such an assumption is imposed, an immediate technical difficulty arises, which is the so-called measurability problem of independent processes. In our context, a signal process that is essentially independent, conditioned on the macro states of nature is never jointly measurable in the usual sense except for trivial cases.
11 Hence, we need to work with a joint agent-probability space
and the probability space (T , T , P ), and retains the Fubini property. Below is a formal definition of the Fubini extension in Definition 2.2 of Sun (2006) .
(1) the two functions f i and f ω are integrable respectively on (Ω, F , P ) for λ-almost all i ∈ I , and on (I, I, λ) for P -almost all ω ∈ Ω;
(2) Ω f i dP and I f ω dP are integrable respectively on (I, I, λ) and (Ω,
To reflect the fact that the probability space (I × Ω, W, Q ) has (I, I, λ) and (Ω, F , P ) as its marginal spaces, as required by the Fubini property, it will be denoted by (I × Ω, I F , λ P ).
, and retains the Fubini property. Thus, one can view λ P s as the conditional probability measure on I × T , givens = s.
We shall assume that f is a measurable process from (I × T , I T ) to T 0 . For any A ∈ T , the Fubini property associated
This means that the process f has event-wise measurable conditional probabilities, as defined in Definition 4 of Hammond and Sun (2008) . By Theorem 1 of Hammond and Sun (2008) , one can always find a real-valued random variables on (T , T , P ) such that f is essentially pairwise independent conditioned ons. The only restriction in this paper is to assume thats takes finitely many values. Since the σ -algebra generated by a real-valued random variable is countably generated, and a countably generated σ -algebra can be approximated by σ -algebras generated by finite partitions in terms of information as shown in Allen (1983) , the assumption that the private signals are essentially pairwise independent conditioned on finitely many macro states of nature is a reasonable assumption.
When the macro state is s, the signal distribution of agent i conditioned on the macro state is P s f −1 i , i.e., the probability for agent i to have q ∈ T 0 as her private signal is 
where 1 {q} is the indicator function of the singleton set {q}. Throughout the rest of this paper, the following non-triviality assumption on the process f will be imposed:
10 For a detailed discussion on pairwise (conditional) independence, see Sun (2006) . 11 See Proposition 2.1 in Sun (2006) , and Proposition 4 in Hammond and Sun (2008) for detailed discussion of the measurability problem.
12 The classical Fubini Theorem is only stated for the usual product measure spaces. It does not apply to integrable functions on (I × Ω, W, Q ) since these functions may not be I ⊗ F -measurable. However, the conclusions of that theorem do hold for processes on the enriched product space (I × Ω, W, Q ) that extends the usual product.
This says that different macro states of nature correspond to different average conditional distributions of agents' signals.
Incentive compatibility and revelation of macro states
The following is a notion of incentive compatibility of a REE in the classical sense. The case of a REE with aggregate signals can be similarly defined. It says that an agent cannot increase her interim expected utility by mis-reporting her private signal.
Definition 5 (Incentive compatibility).
A REE (x * , p * ) is said to be incentive compatible if for λ-almost all i ∈ I ,
holds for P -almost all t ∈ T and for all t i ∈ T 0 .
As shown in the note Sun et al. (forthcoming) , there exists a REE (x * , p * ) in the classical sense in a large private information economy E p , where all the conditions on the information structure in Sections 2.1 and 2.3 are satisfied, such that every agent has an incentive to mis-report her signal.
13 Therefore, considering an arbitrary REE in a large economy may not lead to desirable results. As in Sun and Yannelis (2007) and Sun and Yannelis (2008) , one should pay attention to those REE prices that capture the meaning of perfect competition, i.e., those prices that depend on the macro states and are not influenced by individual agents' private information. 14 This leads us to consider the following key concept in this paper.
Definition 6. Let p be a price process from T to m .
(1) It is said to depend only on the macro states if the σ -algebra generated by p is essentially contained in the σ -algebra generated bys.
15 (2) 
The main result
We are now ready to state the main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 1. There exists an interim efficient REE with aggregate signals in which the equilibrium price p depends only on the macro states.
When the economy has only idiosyncratic level information, i.e., the macro state variables is constant, then the conditional independence in Definition 3 becomes unconditional independence. In this case, Theorem 1 implies that the REE price with aggregate signals is constant and trivially reveals the macro states. Hence, as shown in the following corollary, Lemma 1 implies the existence of a REE in the classical sense. 13 As shown in Section 4 of Sun et al. (forthcoming) , the private signals are independent of each other, and the macro state functions can be regarded as constant. In this case, (x * , p * ) is also trivially a REE with aggregate signals. Example 3 of Heifetz and Minelli (2002) considers a large finite replica economy where an agent in the first replica fails to be incentive compatible. Since we consider an atomless economy, we may ignore a negligible set of agents and thus need a stronger result on the failure of incentive compatibility. 14 We may also point out that it may be too much to require an equilibrium price to reveal all the private information in a large economy. 15 The strong completion of a sub-σ -algebra A of T is the σ -algebra generated by all sets in A and all the P -null sets in T . A sub-σ -algebra A of T is said to be essentially contained in another sub-σ -algebra D of T if the strong completion of A is contained in the strong completion of D.
16 Two σ -algebras are said to be essentially the same if their strong completions are the same.
Corollary 1. If the private signal process f is essentially pairwise independent in the sense that for λ-almost all i ∈ I,t i andt j are independent for λ-almost j ∈ I , then there exists an interim efficient REE in the classical sense in which the equilibrium price is constant.

Discussion
In view of Kreps' example on the non-existence of REE, the earlier contributions on the REE were focused on the generic existence (Radner, 1979; Allen, 1981) . By now, it is well known that with a finite number of agents, the REE not only does not exist universally but also fails to be Pareto efficient and incentive compatible; see Glycopantis et al. (2005, p. 31 , and also Example 9.1.1, p. 43).
In contrast to the above, the current paper demonstrates that the REE with aggregate signals exists universally, and also is Pareto efficient and incentive compatible. Thus, the paper resolves the difficulties that the classical REE faces as a solution concept. Our results enable us to conclude that in the presence of a continuum of agents with non-trivial but negligible private information, the REE with aggregate signals becomes an appealing concept as it does have desirable properties, contrary to the finite agent case.
There are several other papers dealing with the REE with a continuum of agents that we discuss below. Let us say at the outset that our Theorem 1 proves a result about a new REE concept, which has no analog in the literature.
The early contributions by Einy et al. (2000a) , Einy et al. (2000b) consider an asymmetric information economy with a continuum of agents and a finite number of states of nature. The private information of each agent is a partition of the finite state space. Since a finite state space has only finitely many different partitions, we can find a partition on the measure space of agents so that all the agents in each partitioning set of agents share the same private information. Therefore, there is little heterogeneity on the private information side of their model. In contrast, our model allows agents to have non-trivial idiosyncratic private information. Hence, their work is not directly related to ours.
Another interesting paper by Heifetz and Minelli (2002) models the idea of informational smallness without aggregate uncertainty for an asymmetric information economy with a continuum of independent replica economies. The definition of an allocation in their paper is based on the notion of Pettis integral (Definition 6, p. 213). Instead of the usual state-wise feasibility condition, the authors used the condition that the value of the aggregate consumption is equal to the value of the aggregate endowment for every price function (see pp. 212 and 213). Note that this does not imply market clearing, which requires the equality of aggregate consumption and aggregate endowment for almost all the states of nature. It seems to us that the reason they used this approach is to avoid the so-called measurability problem associated with a continuum of independent random variables. 17 Our Corollary 1 has a similar flavor of a constant REE price as in their Theorem 2 on a continuum of independent replica economies. The main differences here are (1) we work with a general continuum economy rather than a replica economy; (2) we work with a general independence condition, and a Fubini extension, where the state-wise feasibility condition is fulfilled (see part 1 of Definition 1). McLean and Postlewaite (2002 , 2003 model the idea of informational smallness (i.e., roughly speaking, approximate perfect competition) in countable replica economies. Their main objective is to show the consistency of ex post efficiency, ex ante core convergence and incentive compatibility.
18 They do not consider the REE notion in those papers.
Concluding remarks
As shown in Lemma 1, the REE in the classical sense and the REE with aggregate signals are equivalent when the equilibrium price fully reveals the macro states. Without such full revelation, they need not be equivalent in general. The following remark considers the case of partial revelation.
Remark 2. If we impose the additional assumptions that the utility functions u (i, x, t) are strictly concave in x and depend only on the agents' private signals in the sense that u (i, x, t) 
we can claim that the REE with aggregate signals and the standard REE are again equivalent when the equilibrium price only depends on the macro states. In particular, for a REE with aggregate signals (x * , p * ), if p * only depends on the macro states, then one can find an allocationx * so that (x * , p * ) is a REE. The other direction is also true.
19 It then follows from Theorem 1 that there exists an interim efficient REE in which the equilibrium price p depends on the macro state of nature; moreover, such a REE is ex post efficient.
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper which models the REE notion with a continuum of agents where both aggregate uncertainty and idiosyncratic private information are included. We believe that the use of aggregate signals is very natural in a large economy setting. Each agent reports her private signal to a center or computer. The relative frequency of the signals is then announced. Agents can then augment their private information by this trivially available public information. The REE with aggregate signals won't make much sense in a finite agent economy since an individual agent can manipulate the aggregate signals. The well-known example of Kreps can be easily modified to show this. In the continuum setting, our new concept seems to be natural, which may also be more appropriate than the classical REE in view of the positive general results obtained in this paper. 21 Finally, it should be noted that the exact limiting results in this paper on an atomless economy with asymmetric information have asymptotic analogs for large but finite asymmetric information economies. In principle, we can use nonstandard analysis to obtain the existence of approximate REE that is approximately incentive compatible for most agents as in Theorem 3 of Sun and Yannelis (2007) .
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Appendix A
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
We outline the proof first. In Step 1, we construct a large deterministic economy for each macro state of nature s ∈ S.
Applying the standard Walrasian equilibrium existence results for a large deterministic economy, we can obtain a Walrasian equilibrium (y s , p s ) for such an economy. In Step 2, we construct a price p * and an allocation x * from the collection of allocation-price pairs {(y s , p s ): s ∈ S}, and show that (x * , p * ) is a REE with aggregate signals in which the equilibrium price depends only on the macro state of nature.
Step 1: Define a function
For each s ∈ S, let ν s be the measure on I × T 0 defined as
for z ∈ R m + .
For each s ∈ S, we define a large deterministic economyĒ
where the utility function for 
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Step 2: Define a mapping
By the non-triviality assumption in Eq. (3) in Section 2.3, there is at most one s such that μ = μ s . Hence, x * is welldefined. Define the following sets
In the recent papers of de Castro et al. (2011) and Condie and Ganguli (2011) , the Bayesian conditional expected utility as used here is replaced by the maximin expected utility in the setting of ambiguity aversion for a finite agent economy with finitely many states. It will be interesting to know if one can consider ambiguity aversion in our setting with a continuum of agents and states to derive new insights. 22 For discussion and references on the general methodology of obtaining asymptotic results in a similar setting, see Section 5 of Sun and Yannelis (2007) .
Examples 3 and 4 of Heifetz and Minelli (2002) consider a large finite replica economy where one agent in the first replica fails to be approximately incentive compatible. There is no contradiction with our results since an asymptotic version of our exact results would only imply approximate incentive compatibility for most agents, but not for a set of agents with small measure.
The non-triviality assumption in Eq. (3) 
Given a macro state s ∈ S, the essential pairwise independence of the private signals t i implies the essential pairwise independence of the random variables y s (i,t i ), i ∈ I , and the random variables e(i,t i ), i ∈ I , respectively. By the exact law of large numbers in Corollary 2.10 of Sun (2006) Consequently, x * is feasible.
Note that for each s ∈ S,s(t) = s,μ(t) = μ s , andp * (t) = p s hold for P -almost all t ∈ L s . Thus, the σ -algebras generated by the random variabless andμ are essentially the same while the σ -algebra generated byp * is a sub-σ -algebra. Hence,
It is left to show that for each agent i ∈ I , x * i maximizes the conditional expected utility U i subject to her budget constraint.
As noted above, for any t ∈ Ω 0 , there is a unique s ∈ S such that t ∈ L s ∩ T s . The budget set for agent i is B i (p  *  (t), t i ) 
Hence, (x * , p * ) constitutes a REE with aggregate signals for the private information economy E. Finally, we shall prove that (x * , p * ) is interim efficient. Suppose the two conditions in the definition of REE with aggregate signals hold for any t ∈T , whereT ∈ T and P (T ) = 1. Fix t ∈T ; we can construct a large deterministic econ-
Then, it is easy to see that (x t ,p t ) is a Walrasian equilibrium for E t . It follows thatx t is efficient in the sense that there is no allocationȳ for the economy E t such that
The above two conditions can be re-written as The other direction of the equivalence result can be readily obtained by constructing a similar allocation as in the second part of the proof for Lemma 1.
